Chapter 7 of Aristotle’s Physics Book II begins by reminding us
of the four causes that Aristotle established in the first section of the
reading, which are “the material, the form, the mover, and that for the sake of
which” (64). Although he has already established that these four causes exist
and that we must take all of them into account, he goes a step further in
chapter seven by suggesting that in nature three out of the four are actually
the same. On page 64, Aristotle says that
three of these causes “turn back into one,” noting that, “the what-it-is and
that for the sake of which are one, and the whence the motion first is, is the
same in form with these,” which would suggest that the formal, efficient, and
final causes are the same. On the next page,
however, he says that the why can be traced back to “the material, and to the
what-it-is [the form], and to the first mover.” Where does this shift come from? Why is the final cause on page 64 switched
out for the material cause on page 65?
In Chapter 8, he then begins to
discuss the “that for the sake of which.” Surprisingly enough, he describes the
“that for the sake of which” in nature by first looking at art. If art, which is always created for the sake
of something, is an imitation of nature, then nature, too, must be for the sake
of something. This cause, he argues, is
different from fortune or chance, neither of which he considers adequate
causes. The “that for the sake of which” can be difficult to identify because
in both art and nature, things often fail to reach their end. So if the “that
for the sake of which” is not chance, nor fortune, nor necessarily where things
always end up in reality, then what is
it?
In Chapter
9 Aristotle tries to help us clarify this a bit more by talking about the
distinction between necessity and the “that for the sake of which.” He gives
the example of a wall. The stones used
to build the wall are necessary to its construction, but they are not the reason the wall is built. The reason the
wall is built is so that it can protect and enclose things. Necessity is conditional, then, while the “that
for the sake of which” is not. The necessary
in natural things is the material and its motions, but what does that make the
end? In Chapter 7 Aristotle suggested that the final and the formal cause were
the same, but can it really be that simple?
Is the end of a tree simply to be a tree, thereby causing it to take the
form of a tree? Do things really seek simply to be, or to thrive and reproduce?
If both natural and artificial things are capable of “missing the mark,” isn’t
it dangerous to see something and simply assume that its form is its end? What if it messed up and took the wrong form? How can we tell?
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