Kant goes to the movies

In thinking about Imanuel Kant's "Duties Towards Animals and Spirits," I could not help but think about a movie I have enjoyed consistently for the past 13 years, My Dog Skip, the coming of age story of small town, big brained Willie Morris and his precious dog, Skip. 
In My Dog Skip (I'm trying really hard not to ruin it in case you haven't seen it (in which case holler at me and i'll give you my amazon prime password to watch it ASAP)) there is a scene in which Skip, as what now we must understand is a thoughtless, feelingless dog, runs around Willie's baseball game stealing the show and ruining the game until havoc wreaks and Willie incurs harm on Skip. At the moment Willie does this, the whole town watching this little league game shrieks in terror that this kind hearted boy would hurt his dog. The way the fans react is exactly what Kant argues, "he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals"(82). Willie shortly after realizes just how wrong he was and just how much he can and did learn from his dog, causing him to go great distances to find him, something Kant would think of as an unnecessary direct action. I think a duty implies it is universal and ethical answer or action, so this one instance cannot exactly disprove the indirectness of animals to humans.When Willie is good to the dog, the whole town knows who both Willie and Skip are and this unpopular boy gets friends-pretty unbelievable display of treating an animal as a neighbor.  Later in this brilliant film, there is a moonshining bad guy who desperately wants to hurt or kill Skip because he thinks Skip is annoying. Despite Skip's being like 15 inches tall and what most of the philosophers have deemed thoughtless, the moonshiner believes Skip is getting in the way of some serious bad guy business. The moonshiner acts as Kant would suggest is not justified because "cruelty for sport cannot be justified"(82). Willie was not trying to be a bad person when he hit Skip, but he improperly tried to attribute a consequence and physical punishment onto Skip for his behavior. 
--Back to hurting animals for a consequence to their poor behavior-- Let us say that animals do not have feeling, and they are on earth to reflect human morals because what you treat something that cannot retaliate and has no direct duty onto humans and humans onto it should foil one's own values. If these creatures exist for humans, and humankind is the center, as this "Anthropocentrism" section in our compilation argues, there is no reason for humans to purposefully treat an animal badly, ever, which seems more like an argument for animals than humans. 
Kant's argument opens the door for anthropocentrism in a new light, one of morals; in order to be human, one must limit as much destruction as possible (83) because indirect duty is attached to everything. 
This makes me question why aren't more people more conscience? I hope we all think animal crush videos are bad and evil, but where does the disconnect come from when we don't feel bad about printing off too much paper or even swatting a fly?
Is Kant right? Does his weird spirit argument seem like Newton's (sorry I don't really address it here, I touched on it on Maggie's post-check her's out!) 

Thomas Aquinas: Humans as Moral Ends

All else in nature is there for the sake of humans. Humans are there for the sake of themselves. We cannot find a reason for human beings to exist for anything else; we have no natural predators, and we do not seem facilitate any important natural processes. In all other things or organisms on earth we can find some purpose or creature that they serve outside of themselves. However, humans do not seem to live for or serve any other earthly creature. Are human beings then according to Aquinas, the final cause of nature, as Aristotle would describe them?

We know human beings are there for the sake of themselves and not for the sake of others partially because they have “dominion” over themselves. They are not like the animals that act in a set manner according to a specific stimulus. Humans do not act by instinct; they can control how and why and when they act. Are human beings really so far removed from the supposed machine-like manner by which animals operate? Or are we actually acting according to a set group of rules or laws or instincts, that are simply appear complicated by our own diverse experiences?

This dominion humans have over themselves is important because it means we are intellectual creatures, which makes us like God. God is truly the ultimate, perfect intellect. Human beings are the earthly beings most like the divine in that they have that intellect. God’s intellect is the ultimate end, but human beings, in being formed in God’s image, have a part of this divine intellect. Because God is divine intellect, then by providing for humans, who have that intellect imperfectly, He is providing for the ultimate end: divine intellect. If God’s divine intellect really is the ultimate end, then why are humans necessary or useful at all? How does the providing for and preserving of intellectual earthly creatures contribute to the divine end? Does God need anything or anyone to validate His own existence?

How does the intellect use nature other than as resource preserve itself in humans? The intellect demonstrates its power when it is being used, when the mind is thinking, contemplating, discovering. God has no need to do these activities, for not only does he have reason and intellect but he also has complete knowledge of the world and its processes (which he created). Perhaps this is why God needs, or at least likes to have, humans. Humans can really use the intellect to learn and discover. I’m not thinking that Aquinas was suggesting this thought, but do humans actually have the ability to do something God cannot do? To learn and discover?

At the end of this passage, Aquinas discusses our duties to animals. In the end, it seems that we really have no duties towards animals except as those duties ultimately affect us.  How do his views differ from those of Kant?

Newton's Mechanistic Metaphysics

Isaac Newton discussed his take on causes in Mechanistic Metaphysics. This excerpt from his work Optiks is brief but comprehensive. He begins by addressing properties of matter like inertia, gravity, and fermentation. Newton describes these phenomena as manifest. The qualities are obvious; it is only the cause that is occult. Bodily things operate under principles of motion, not according to supernatural and random guides. Newton calls for a set of laws which material things follow, but does not attempt to find the laws. He introduces the concept of an intelligent designer that created these principles, principles that must be responsible for creation instead of chaos.  He uses the nearly perfect orbit of the planets as an example. Animals are also quite similar, he says, most having bilateral symmetry and many of the same body parts. This is thanks to a designer as well. Here, Newton sets up a mechanized view of the universe. Many bodies in this universe are so similar that it can’t just be chance.

The intelligent agent described doesn’t have organs or body parts like animals do. This distinction is interesting because it separates the designer from the mechanism of the universe Newton just described. God, he says, doesn’t need sensory organs because he is present for all things at all times. He is better at moving the contents of the universe than they are at moving themselves. What sets the designer apart is that he is not very similar to anything at all. How something so dissimilar to the universe could be responsible for its existence makes total sense to Newton. A god so estranged from the similarities of the universe means a god that can effectively mechanize his world, drawing to the belief of mechanistic metaphysics.

While Newton seems very sure of his arguments (the excerpt closes with, “I see nothing of Contradiction in all this,”) many more questions can be asked in response. Why must there be occult causes, or even a creator, when Laws of Motion were already being explored and laws for material things were thought important? Newton makes great conclusions about the universe but relies on an intelligent designer to explain it. He even says that God can create different types of matter, therefore matter might not always follow the same natural laws. How does a more modern take on the relationship between a creator and natural laws compare?  

John Stuart Mill: The Amoral Status of Nature

          The piece written by Mill proves to be a work that poses as many questions as it answers. It contradicts thoughts proposed by Aristotle, Bacon and at times Mill seems to either contradict himself or leave questions open ended. Mill approaches the same questions proposed by these previous philosophers, seeking answers for the driving forces behind nature. While Aristotle proposed the four causes, the most important being the end; Mill does not see nature moving in order to do something as Aristotle does. Mill's thinking has an underlying idea that nature feeds off necessity, which stem from his conceived "laws of particular phenomenon, and also, more generally, Laws of Nature"(74). It is interesting to note that Mill incorporates the use of induction, moving from the particular to the general. Mill however, gives nature a more encompassing power, stating that all phenomena are aspects of nature. Nature seems to be, according to Mill, a much more general term than that proposed by Aristotle or Bacon.

          Mill's writing becomes very convoluted, giving two seemingly contradictory notions for understanding and defining nature. He begins by downplaying the role of man in man made things. Since man is punitive in comparison to man, and as Mill later say "Man necessarily obeys the laws of nature, or in other words the properties of things", Mill surmises that nature is still the ultimate driving force behind mechanical devices and constructions.(75) Man simply is there to move things from place to place and put them where they belong. Aristotle would say that Man creates the form. This argument, though a very interesting and unique, even rogue interpretation, Mill doesn't really leave much room for anything to not be classified as nature. In a possible attempt to draw back and remedy that, Mill proposes that there are two possible definitions of nature. The first, in accordance with his previously mentioned theory, is that nature "means all the powers existing in either the outer or the inner world and everything which takes place by means of those powers"(74). His second presentation of nature, is similar with the distinction that nature is "only what takes place without the agency, or without the voluntary and intentional agency, of man"(74). Is Mill proposing a question with two solutions because he is indecisive? Is he simply contradicting himself?
          So Mill does accurately see the greater amount of power which nature holds. We have seen many examples of how man has tried to thwart nature, and only produced more consequences. Mill's writing serves more as a word of advice to his audience, stressing that we must use nature, by obeying it. He says that "though we can do nothing except through laws of nature, we can use on law to counteract another"(75). Though I appreciate his respect for nature's immovable power, I find the Mill doesn't really give much insight into how someone would truly make a difference through this abstract strategy. I also have a problem with his use of the idea that by obeying nature we seek to control it. This again seems like a contradiction of ideas, and I truly feel like Mill has skipped analyzing the particulars, and jumped straight the the vague and general solutions. Mill is with no doubt a higher level thinking than myself at this point in my life... though my future is still unknown. Nevertheless, I find this piece riddled with contradictions and open ended questions. I also feel that he categorizes too much under the umbrellas of nature, phenomena, and laws of Nature. I do however find his idea that even man made structures can be viewed as nature, because in certain ways man is only the mover in the process.... Yet I am still not completely sold on that notion either. Either way, I believe this piece will especially offer itself well to class discussion due to its inconsistencies, open ended ideas, and debatable concepts. -Nick
         

Nonhumans as Machines- Descartes

Descartes here is making a case for an immortal soul exclusive to humans. His argument is that nonhuman animals are unthinking machine-like things (so much so that they could be replaced with machines and everyone would be none the wiser) whereas we humans are unique due to our reason and souls. He says that other animals are only moved by passions or impulses, and that even when they are very good at imitating us or doing tricks for us, it is only out of fear or the desire for a treat, not thinking. He does not deny the existence of life or sensations in these lesser automatons, and even admits to their being better than us at some things, such as in physical strength or ability, but says that these do not support the existence of an immortal soul, and perhaps even strengthen his own argument. For Descartes, to be human is to use real speech, which he defines as “indicating by word or sign something relating to thought alone and not to natural impulse.”

Descartes lived and wrote in a time before robots, artificial intelligence, neuroscience and extensive animal behavior studies, and in working with what he had came up with good and sound ideas. He even seems to foreshadow the phenomenon of the “uncanny valley,” that feeling of unease at something very close to being human (as in, robot puppies are cute, but the robots in “I, Robot” kind of freak people out). However, without turning this into some research paper here, I’m not sure that what he says holds quite so true today. Some animals seem to show some inklings of intelligence or consciousness, even if quite removed from our own in terms of any sort of ranking system as Descartes points out. Sure, I guess that dolphins playing or having sex for fun can be attributed to nothing more than their urges, but then when you start to look into some experiments with great apes and even parrots, the idea that all nonhuman behavior is some conditioned response grows less convincing. Koko the gorilla learned to sign hundreds of words to express thoughts, even creating her own signs and communicating seemingly without hope of some immediate reward such as food. Alex the African Grey parrot is said to have shown the intelligence of a five year old human in terms of recognizing objects by identity, shape, color, and so forth; was beginning to learn phenomes; and created his own word combinations similarly to Koko. Whether these behaviors by these animals would warrant Descartes to say they indicate the presence of souls is debatable, and to what extent they express some consciousness is a point of a good bit of contention among scientists today. Consciousness is definitely weird, and you can’t blame someone, especially from a time such as Descartes’ (pre-Darwin and all), in thinking that it makes our species special. We are unique, but whether we are better is more than debatable. 

The New Organon

           Book I of The New Organon begins with Francis Bacon’s idea of human’s view of nature. He argues that humans cannot fully understand nature. While man has science, science alone does not allow us to comprehend every aspect of nature. As he says in page 33, all we humans can do is “bring natural bodies together and take them apart”, but that humans do not actually know what nature is doing. In the first aphorism, Bacon says that man “does and understands only as much as he has observed of the order of nature in fact or by inference; he does not know and cannot do more”. With this in mind, what is nature of interpretation? What can humans say about nature if we cannot be certain about anything?

           

            Bacon writes of two ways to investigate and discover truth; a way used currently, and a way that has never been used.  The current way of investigation, which Bacon does not agree with, involves jumping to a general axiom (something that applies to one particular thing) from a particular axiom (something that applies to a group). Bacon views this as humans using their knowledge to make assumptions about nature, and later filling in the “missing steps” (called “intermediate axioms” (36)) to make their assumption truth. What is the problem with this means of investigation?

Bacon proposes a new way of discovering truth, using the idea of moving gradually towards a claim instead of quickly making a general axiom. His argument is that one cannot assume something based solely on past events. Bacon suggests the proper way of investigation starts with making a particular axiom with general knowledge, and then slowly building on that information to make an “interpretation of nature”, gathered “piece by piece” (38).

Bacon’s work countered Aristole’s view of nature. Aristotle made many generalizations with what he observed: he assumed that a tree and a bed both have causes because they are made of the same material (the “out of which”). These types of connections led him to believe that everything in nature has an end, a specific form, and a first mover. Bacon did not agree with this, calling this type of reasoning an “anticipation of nature” (38), and claiming that such anticipations “are gathered from just a few instances, especially those common and familiar” (38), pointing out exactly how Aristotle drew his conclusions, from only a few similar characteristics. This raises the question: Whose view of nature is correct? Is either Bacon or Aristotle correct? Or can parts of their viewpoints be combined to formulate a different standpoint on human’s view of nature?

The Mastery of Nature

Bacon stresses the importance of having a firm grasp on Forms, the Latent Process, and the Latent Configuration. Bacon’s new methodology for understanding nature is based on “true and perfect rules of operation.” These rules provide direction allowing for our understanding of nature to be “certain, free, and disposing or leading to action.” How any one thing can be certain and free? By embracing the concept of Form “truth in speculation and freedom in operation” are obtainable. Bacon gives little guidance for how to go about understanding all that is Form, his use of meandering metaphors and whimsical language causes me consistent confusion. Bacon claims that “true form deduces nature,” yet this deduced nature is complicated by being interconnected to additional nature which coincide to form the natural order of things. For Bacon to broadly exclaim that the interconnectedness of Form results in natural order is preposterous. Bacon’s concept of understanding Form is to embrace the unity of nature, but is that not the same as understanding the natural order inherent in all Forms?

Bacon’s explanation of Latent Process if far more practical that the concept of Form. I think that Latent Process as described in the text is rational and applicable to understanding nature as a dynamic and interconnected entity. Bacon reasons that “every natural action depends on things indefinitely small.” This intricate interplay helps broaden the scope at which we as humans understand nature, allowing us to really examine nature. Bacon makes a stark remark by saying “nobody can hope to govern or change nature until he has duly comprehended and observed them.” This statement resonates with my understanding of human attempt to control the biosphere, and how we can’t stop nature because we don’t fully understand the intricacies of what had gone before and what will come after.

Latent Configuration is the “separation of bodies of universal form structure.” Bacon reasons that Latent Configuration is the act of using reason and true induction to discover what exists not due to separation by fire or chemicals, but due to the natural and exact interactions that create distinct entities. Bacon’s understanding of homogenous parts seems to be based very closely on what I think of as elements and the way they combine to form discrete units. Bacon makes a reasonable argument about basics of constructing bodies, but I don’t see how these building blocks will reveal the nature of the object. 

Aristotle's Physics II (Ch. 7-9)

Chapter 7 of Aristotle’s Physics Book II begins by reminding us of the four causes that Aristotle established in the first section of the reading, which are “the material, the form, the mover, and that for the sake of which” (64). Although he has already established that these four causes exist and that we must take all of them into account, he goes a step further in chapter seven by suggesting that in nature three out of the four are actually the same.  On page 64, Aristotle says that three of these causes “turn back into one,” noting that, “the what-it-is and that for the sake of which are one, and the whence the motion first is, is the same in form with these,” which would suggest that the formal, efficient, and final causes are the same.  On the next page, however, he says that the why can be traced back to “the material, and to the what-it-is [the form], and to the first mover.”  Where does this shift come from?  Why is the final cause on page 64 switched out for the material cause on page 65?

In Chapter 8, he then begins to discuss the “that for the sake of which.” Surprisingly enough, he describes the “that for the sake of which” in nature by first looking at art.  If art, which is always created for the sake of something, is an imitation of nature, then nature, too, must be for the sake of something.  This cause, he argues, is different from fortune or chance, neither of which he considers adequate causes. The “that for the sake of which” can be difficult to identify because in both art and nature, things often fail to reach their end. So if the “that for the sake of which” is not chance, nor fortune, nor necessarily where things always end up in reality, then what is it?

              

          In Chapter 9 Aristotle tries to help us clarify this a bit more by talking about the distinction between necessity and the “that for the sake of which.” He gives the example of a wall.  The stones used to build the wall are necessary to its construction, but they are not the reason the wall is built. The reason the wall is built is so that it can protect and enclose things.  Necessity is conditional, then, while the “that for the sake of which” is not.  The necessary in natural things is the material and its motions, but what does that make the end? In Chapter 7 Aristotle suggested that the final and the formal cause were the same, but can it really be that simple?  Is the end of a tree simply to be a tree, thereby causing it to take the form of a tree? Do things really seek simply to be, or to thrive and reproduce? If both natural and artificial things are capable of “missing the mark,” isn’t it dangerous to see something and simply assume that its form is its end?  What if it messed up and took the wrong form?  How can we tell?

Aristotle's Physics

In the first three chapters of the Physics, Aristotle offers us an account of nature and causation. Aristotle’s account of causation follows his account of nature, but it might be better for us to start with an explanation of what he means by causation Aristotle distinguishes between four kinds of causes:

•  Material: “that out of which something comes into being, still being present in it.” Bronze is the material cause of the statue; paper and ink are the material causes of a book; chlorofluorocarbons are a material cause of the deteriorated atmosphere.
• Formal: “the form or pattern” whose presence makes a thing what it is; the “gathering in speech of what-it-is-for-it-to-be.” Aristotle gives the example of the octave and the 2:1 ratio, but this concept is still rather confusing to me.
• Efficient: “whatever makes the changing thing change,” or that thing outside of the thing so changed which sets it into motion. A mother is the efficient cause of her children; a builder is the efficient cause of a dam.
• Final: “the end” for which a thing is changed or set into motion. A controlled Mississippi is the final cause of establishing a system of locks; saving the harbor was the final cause of the efforts to stop Heimay’s flow.

It is important to note that a single event has all of these causes; causes are “as many things as come between the mover of something” and its “end,” or effect.

          Aristotle gives, historically, our earliest distinction between the living and the made. Nature is made distinct from the works of human beings, although Aristotle notes that every thing has its own “nature,” or composition. The nature of a desk, therefore, is wood, while the nature of a tree is somewhat more complex, including growth. Nature (in the overarching sense) “is twofold, and is both form and material,” and an individual thing’s nature is determined by both (52). Furthermore, nature does not set things in motion haphazardly. Aristotle writes: “Nature is a certain source and cause of being moved and of coming to rest in that which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not incidentally” (49). Paraphrased roughly, nature is the cause of motion and coming to rest in those things which are a part of it, in virtue of its own composition. To put nature in the terms of causes, Nature is the efficient, formal, and material cause of all things (save itself). This raises two curious questions: what is nature’s end, for which nature itself is set in motion?* And what is the cause of nature?

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*  It strikes me as an unanswerable question, even if the premise that nature has an end is true, but it might be worth asking anyway. Thomas Nagel (the philosopher mentioned in an earlier response to Ben’s post) proposes a teleological conception of the universe, in which mind and mental activity is an intentional development in the universe aimed towards some ultimate, complex end.

The Idea of Nature

Collingwood's introduction details the historical development of the philosophical view of nature from three different eras. He compares the views of the Greek and the Renaissance philosophers, and then explains how modern schools of thought discount many of their theories. He states that the modern view of nature abandons the theory that nature is mechanical. Machines need to be "finished" in order to properly function, so a common belief is that "there may be machines in nature, but nature cannot itself be a machine"(Collingwood 14). This caused me to question what are some specific entities in nature that function as a machine? Do these machines have a creator? When are these machines finished and can they function properly without being finished?
While reading this chapter I also began to question mankind's overall purpose in nature. Do we include ourselves in our definition of nature? Or do we simply use this term to define the organisms outside of the human race? Do we as individuals have specific functions that progress nature as a whole?

Heraclitus

Although the references to Heraclitus’ work were written thousands of years ago, his conception of nature is the same to those of modern ecology. On Friday we defined ecology as the “interactions of organisms in a shared environment” or a way of looking at the whole interconnected system, rather than just the individual parts of nature. In the context of that discussion, here are my reactions to the thoughts of Heraclitus.

194: When Heraclitus uses the word Logos, he is referring to a principle of order and knowledge. He believes that everything, and in this case nature, comes into being without the knowledge and understanding of humans. Everything is connected in a balanced system. In the context of a balanced ecosystem, many humans fail to realize what impact they are having on this balanced and connected system.

195: Although it is necessary for humans to view nature as a whole, or to acknowledge that it is a series of logical connections linking every entity to another, humans continue to live their lives as though they have a “private understanding” of what nature is and how they fit into nature.

196: If you take the time to observe nature and “listen” to it, you will realize that all things are connected and can be seen as one.

199: Nature is made so that everything has its place. We can think about the sea as a whole and then more specifically what makes up the sea and what is our place in the sea. For the fish the sea is pure because it provides life. However, for man the sea is “polluted” in a way that man cannot survive in the sea the way fish do. However, humans are still connected to the sea and still contribute to the sea as a whole.

201: The difficult things in life help us to appreciate the good things we have. Without suffering and pain we may not be able to appreciate fully a life of health and happiness.

207-209: Often times the obvious connection is not immediately apparent. If we must work hard to understand the connection between two things, we may be more likely to appreciate that connection. Things that come easily to us are not always appreciated to the same degree as when we must work harder to achieve that thing. If Heraclitus was known for having such convoluted teachings, maybe his goal was to force the reader to work hard to understand them so then perhaps they appreciate his teachings more. Similarly, some of the most important processes such as global warming are not obvious to the human understanding, yet may prove to be more important and vital to life than those connections that are more immediately obvious. Often times what we think of as nature is only touching the surface of what nature actually is and the rest of it is hidden from our understanding.

214: There is an ever-present change in the universe forbidding anything to remain the same. A river will still be a river the next day, but it will have changed and will have been impacted by everything else in nature. Since everything in nature is connected, what leaves the river becomes something else just as other elements are constantly added creating a new river.

Whether or not Heraclitus was referring to nature and ecosystems, his concepts are applicable to our studies today. He supports the notion that everything in nature is interconnected and so nature as a whole must be understood before its individual parts can be known. 

The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology

"Ecology has made plain to us the fact that we are enfolded, involved, and engaged within the living, terrestrial, environment- i.e., implicated in and implied by it." According to Baird Callicott, we humans are taking in nature and nature is taking in us. This is due to the energy flow within the environment. Callicott dances around this idea and doesn't give us his realization until he describes his own self-discovery while standing beside the Mississippi river. Before his "self-discovery" near the end of his essay, it took a lot to put together the pieces he was leading the reader to. He of course often referred to many other philosophers or environmentalists who all tie in together with this idea that humans and nature are apart of another. Section two of his essay he brings forth the metaphysical implications of ecology through a foil. Why would it be necessary to use such a device? I like how he bases his argument off of the atom; the most basic unit of matter and what makes up everything on the planet. I never thought of an atom being mechanical and I don't quite follow why Callicott adds this to his essay? Maybe someone can help me understand the motive behind this statement. Plato's theory of forms was a new concept to me and I found myself agreeing with Plato and then Aristotle had to take it up a notch with his own theory. Who do you think has more of the right idea and why would Callicott put two opposing arguments in his essay? I'm not sure which one is supposed to be supporting it but I think he was going for Aristotle's. One more interesting food for thought idea was of course the food chain. I knew it was important but I didn't know that it was important enough to suggest that humans and animals are also connected in linear lines of energy that happen to cross each other. And this also brings up the concept of karma. Do you think that's a little of a stretch? I find it believably but Callicott could just be throwing us through a loop like all great philosophers. His essay ends on a personal note to his audience. The river's pain was his pain. It would sound absurd if he began his essay with this notion but he waited until the last moment to throw in his personal experience. I believe it puts emphasis on the crisis in this new day and age, and that young people need to take action. Trash flowing down the Mississippi River is not okay. It isn't healthy for it nor is it healthy for us. Thanks for reading! I've never done anything like this so I hope this was okay!

Getting Along With Nature:

First and foremost, there is a distinction/idea that must become prevalent within any discussion of environmental philosophy or ethics. This idea, stated specifically by Berry, reads as such:

"Pure Nature, anyhow, is not good for humans to live, and humans do not want to live in it...It is equally true that a condition that is purely human is not good for people to live in..."

Thus, we have a necessary dichotomy between the natural world and the human world that exist both separately but, as Berry argues, co-dependent from each other. We live, quite happily, in a position of one foot in nature and the other within the techno-sphere. It then becomes apparent that we, as humans, hold a conscious responsibility to "get along with nature".

According to Berry, this is not only the correct thing to do but it is necessary thing to do. Necessary in the sense that we as humans have achieved a point/stance where nature not only surrounds us but has become an integral part of living as a sentient being. As Berry so aptly states, "people cannot live apart of nature. And yet, people cannot live in nature without changing it". This idea is not so similar to the idea that humans come from nature and have always existed within nature and therefore become malevolent to the nature around them through their destructive tendencies. Instead, the idea of nature has become a source of inspiration, positivism, and hopefulness within the human psych. The result is a psychiatric need for a source of virgin nature that comes to represent both escape and something that is wonderful and exists outside the realm of human perception. We need nature for this purpose. It stands as a shining beacon within our psych that the techno-sphere has not over-enveloped our consistent call back to pure nature and that there exists a place of primeval essence and origin.

Thus, it is necessary, at a our core, to get along with nature. Recently, however, a new phenomenon has seemed to have emerged within the natural world in that nature is getting along with us. Berry makes a reference to the book The Desert Smells Like Rain and explains that there are instances where nature is left to it's own devices and, because of its consistent connection within the human realm, begins to drastically decrease. This, at least for me, prompts a few questions/concerns...

If we are at the point where nature has now become dependent upon our actions, do we now have dominion/authority in deciding its fate within our world?

Additionally, if we hold such a symbiotic/co-dependent relationship with nature, is it proper for nature to rely on us? Would it be morally/ethically better to insure that nature becomes an independent entity (non-dependent on our actions) or is it just a repercussion of human nature that nature must "learn" to cope with us to insure its own survival?

A long comment in response to Ben's post on Berry's "Preserving Wildness:"

As the title states, this is written in response to Ben's post below on Wendell Berry's "Preserving Wildness." In it, he raises two related questions I to which I wish to respond:

"What were your general reactions to Berry's claims about necessity (p 148)? What kind of variables should be considered when asking the question 'what is necessary for the best human life'?"

As my response was rather long (it relates to some other things I've been working on, so I fleshed it out perhaps more than was necessary), I'm opting to publish it as a full post. If this causes any problems, I can easily relegate it to the comments section. To the point:

     The word necessity in relation to discussion of animals and our environment tends to evince a utilitarian sort of thinking. By asking “what is necessary for an animal to live?” we ask what an animal needs, and such needs are often quickly subordinated underneath those we perceive (correctly or not) as our own. Necessity enters the conversation as a technical term used towards utilitarian-technological ends. All animals need food and water, and a sort of stretched notion of shelter (a place to live and roam); all animals need a sort of community (even the solitary ones, elsewise the species would go extinct pretty quickly). This is what is necessary for an animal to survive, in the meagre, brute sense of the word, and by this definition of what is necessary, the cows on factory farms arguably have what they need. Up, of course, to the point where they are killed, processes, and packaged. Their needs are provided or, and so our ours. This kind of thinking is what Berry calls "technological heroism," but his use of the word necessity allows us to pose different questions regarding our interactions with animals and our environment.

     Berry links the notion of what is necessary to an organism to what it is like to be that organism, though he phrases this in slightly different terms. What is necessary for an owl is determined by what it is like for an owl to exist in and perceive the world as an owl-centric place. Any given owl has his or her own subjectivity. In calling attention to this, Berry changes the kinds of questions we ask to determine what’s best for us: instead of asking simply what is necessary for an animal to live or survive, we must ask what is necessary for each creature to do “on its own behalf” and in its “own domus, or home” in order to live. The animal is wrapped up in his or her own intentional responses to his or her environment. While our perspective must be privileged (elsewise we set ourselves up for own diminishment, if not destruction), we still must, in order to preserve the wildness and wilderness that are themselves necessary for human life, be mindful of other animals’ needs, which are met through active doings and which are particular to the place where they live.

     But can we know what it’s like to live as an owl?[1] The project of stewardship (and of conservation, for that matter) depends on our ability to adequately answer this. Considering how Berry accurately, I think, embeds us within nature, our capability (or lack thereof) to know what is necessary for any number of animals complicates our attempts to conserve and cultivate the wild environments we need in order for us to live the best human life possible. Berry encourages us to phrase questions of necessity for humans and other animals in a manner that disrupts a primarily technological ideology, forcing us to view animals as having their own perspectives and dependencies upon the environment which we share. But Berry unfortunately does not give us a full account of how we might balance our own considerations with those of our animal counterparts, or even a an account of how we might come to know their perspectives, both of which will be needed if we are to develop an ethical system.

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[1] I’m pretty taken (though not unreservedly) by an essay by Thomas Nagel, titled “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, part of which argues (to put it briefly and in broad terms) that the internal mental states of other animals are utterly inaccessible to us, and that we cannot know what it is like to be another animal. To illustrate this point: imagine perceiving the world through echolocation.

Preserving Wilderness, Wendell Berry

“To use or not to use nature is not a choice that is available to us; we can live only at the expense of other lives. Our choice has rather to do with how and how much to use” (139).

Wendell Berry, Home Economics. (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 1987).

Wendell Berry begins his reflection on the discussion of human's relationship with nature by noting that the conversation is rather polarized. After describing the general viewpoints of the technocrat and the nature romantic, Berry claims that both polarized viewpoints are missing "the real location of the problem" (138), which he thinks is in the middle ground. After providing a list of the assumptions that define his position, Berry goes on to suggest a reevaluation of the nature/artifice distinction and then reflects upon how this reevaluation influences our thoughts about economic systems, material goods, humanity's self-centered view, and the issue of population size. 

 In an effort to avoid mere summarizing, I will provide a few questions concerning some of the major topics or themes I found most interesting in "Preserving Wilderness".

Berry's Assumptions

In assumptions 1 and 2, Berry talks of nature as having a tolerance towards our existence as a species and that it is "somewhat hospitable". Should we be concerned that Berry describes nature as having some kind of awareness of our existence? Would this encourage more anthropomorphic views of nature, such as the military viewpoints in McPhee or the idea of Mother Nature? 

Is Berry correct in thinking that it is impossible for humans to intend exclusively their own good? (Assumption 5)

What might be motivating Berry's emphasis on local practice in the same assumption?

Other topics

What were your general reactions to Berry's claims about necessity (p 148)? What kind of variables should be considered when asking the question "what is necessary for the best human life"?

If Berry is correct in his claim that humans must be made by culture (p. 141), what might a society that practices this "double recovery" have as characteristics?

Berry proposes a redefining of materialism, one in which we value quality and durability over cost of production. Is it even conceivable for this kind of economic value system to exist in an open and free market?

The Trouble With Wilderness: William Cronon

The main argument in Cronon's article is that wilderness is "quite profoundly a human creation-- indeed, the creation of very particular human cultures" rather than a "pristine sanctuary." This idea conflicts directly with what many Americans view as wilderness.

As Cronon lays out his argument, he addresses the frontier myth. He basically states that the immigrants who came from Europe to America for the first time experienced a climate shock. Coming from the densely populated land of Europe to the vast open spaces of the Americas, the Easterners “shed the trappings of civilization and thereby gained an energy, an independence and creativity.” This sensation that overcame the Easterners embodied itself within the wild landscape of America, thereby imposing this idea to represent what is viewed as nature or wilderness. As civilization began to take hold in the Americas, the preservation of this feeling was highly sought after. Due to its association with the idea of the American mentality, landscapes were preserved and labeled as “wilderness.”

Cronon explains that this is a fundamental flaw in which many base their view of wilderness upon. Cronon argues that not only were the places that we consider “wilderness” (National Parks) once inhabited by Native Americans, but also that this view of wilderness is completely fabricated by humans. What we chose to preserve and how we chose to preserve it directly reflects the values of our society. All of the National Parks that are uninhabited by humans are in fact not a preservation of what was there originally, but a showcase of what our culture has deemed to represent freedom.

Therefore, we base the idea of our roots within an incorrect representation of wilderness. People see nature as an entity separate from us. To many, nature is what we drive to see or stay a weekend at the Grand Canyon in order to observe. Instead of recognizing our impact within nature and incorporating ourselves into the equation, we separate ourselves from it. This thereby causes a lack of self-awareness in terms of environmental issues.

Cronon asserts the fact that we must rethink the way we view wilderness and realize that we are a major part of it. It is only when we accept our place in nature that we can make great strides towards sustainability. We must be aware of what resources we use and assess whether or not we can keep using them.

While some could look at Cronon's thesis with considerable alarm, accusing him of lending intellectual support to the corporate project of taking over the nation's wilderness and selling out to developmental interests, it does not seem that this is his objective. Cronon does not condemn the idea of a national park. In fact, he even states that it is a good way for many people to grasp the wonder of life and provide “proof that ours is not the only presence in the universe.” Cronon does condemn the notion that these National Parks represent the society’s view of nature. We cannot truly care for something that we are completely separated from.

After reading this article, a couple questions came to mind: Have we already gone too far? The world population has grown massively in the recent century and globally we are already consuming more than we can produce per year. Is it possible to fully incorporate ourselves within nature? There seems to be a gray line between the biosphere and the technosphere and we have been walking on it for quite some time. While it is evident that we are moving away from the biosphere and more into the technosphere, is there a way we could balance the two without hurting progress? Do we even want to balance? Should we just accept our impending progression towards the technosphere and try to compensate?