"Dogs Are People, Too" NYTimes this week

"Dogs are people, too"

Here's an interesting article I've been thinking about all week that may bring up the potential to argue for animal rights based on some sort of science, and I thought you all might enjoy it. There's a study getting dogs to go into MRI machines, and then these researchers look at their brains and compare dog brains to human brains.

Tom Regan's Case for Animal Rights

Tom Regan is an advocate of animal rights.

In this article he begins by defining the goals of animal rights movement, which are practical in their ends:

1.  Abolishing animal use in science

 

2.  Dissolving commercial animal agriculture

3.  Eliminating all forms of hunting and trapping (and presumably fishing, though not listed)

These goals are absolute in their scope, and Regan acknowledges that some proponents of animal rights make moral allowances, such as animal testing for cancer research.  He considers the basis of these allowances to be emotional and says they still reflect a mindset of animals as resources for humans.  Regan argues that the goals of the animal rights movement are based in reason, not just emotion, and he lays out the historical reasoning that led to this view.

Question:  Why should humans not mistreat animals?

1.  The Kantian Account
Answer:  People who mistreat animals are likely to mistreat other humans as well.
Problem:  While we would not disagree with Kant's reasoning, he presents good conduct towards animals as only necessary when beneficial to humans.  Regan argues that this reasoning promotes speciesism, a viewpoint which still evokes prejudice against the interests of non-human animals.  Such a viewpoint would not contribute to the idea of animal rights.

2.  The Cruelty Account
Answer:  Mistreating animals is cruelty, and humans should not be cruel.
Definition:  Cruelty is defined by John Locke as causing suffering to a sentient creature and taking pleasure in doing so.
Problem:  Not all things addressed by the goals of animal rights fall into this definition of cruelty.  Regan cites the Draize test, a type of experimentation in which toxic substances are applied to the skin or eyes of animal subjects and the effects are monitored.  It is not likely that researchers take pleasure in the pain inflicted on the subjects, so their actions do not fall under Locke's definition of cruelty.  Nonetheless animal rights activists take issue with the practice, even if not with the practitioners themselves.  Cruelty by this definition will not suffice to establish a basis for animal rights.

 

An albino rabbit allegedly used in a Draize test

3.  The Utilitarian Account
Answer:  Mistreatment of animals runs contrary to the principles of equality and utility.
Definitions:  (1) The principle of equality declares that desires and needs are of equal importance to different individuals, the desires and needs are equal no matter who or what the individuals are.  (2) The principle of utility dictates that humans ought to bring about the greatest good outcomes over bad outcomes, accounting for interests of everyone affected.
Problem:  Equality and utility are not inherently connected.  It is possible to increase good outcomes but disproportionately for some interested groups.  Thus utility can allow for the introduction of prejudice, making it an unfit basis for animal rights.

Regan proposes that it is possible to account for animal rights (while avoiding all of the shortcoming above) by simply postulating the existence of animal rights, similarly to human rights.

1. In some situations the group does wrong to ignore individual rights (Romans executing Christians).
2. In other situations the individual ought to surrender rights for the good of a greater whole (Bert has eaten the microfilm).
3. Individuals' right to avoid harm should be overridden only under certain conditions:
1. Overriding individual right is the only realistic way to prevent harm to innocent others.  OR
2. Overriding individual right is the only realistic way to prevent a chain of events that would have brought harm to innocent others.  OR
3. Overriding individual right is the only reasonable hope of preventing harm to innocent others.
4. IF animals have the right not to be harmed, that right cannot be violated unless one of these conditions is met, and the weight of proof is on those causing harm.
5. Do animals have the right not to be harmed?

The same question, when posed of human rights, inquires whether humans have inherent value, independent of their utility and/or value according to another human.  Humans are mistreated when they are considered to have no value other than for the interests of others.

IF humans and/or animals have inherent value, then their rights are derived from the value of the individual, not the value of consequences.



All photo credits:  Wikipedia

Midgley- The End of Anthropocentrism?

In Mary Midgley’s The End of Anthropocentrism?, we are taken through time looking at how anthropocentrism has fluctuated in human history. With the beginnings of humans it was very certain and correct, to place oneself at the center of the universe. With such a limited understanding of the world, and beyond, it made perfect sense to be anthropocentric. This thinking was furthered with coming of religious thoughts that humans were made in the image of a humanoid god. Kant is referenced in saying that humans are dominant over nature because they are “the single being upon earth that possesses understanding.” With such a view it was only a matter of time until nature was commoditized for human use. As humans advanced with science and technology, it seemed certain that humans were destined to be masters of the universe. However, as science progressed and humans became aware of the sheer vastness of the universe anthropocentrism came into question. The idea that Earth was made for solely for humans has come to appear more and more farfetched. Midgley says that humans need to look out for not just their own interests, but the interests of the entire biosphere. Humans are inextricable from the problems earth faces, most of which humans themselves cause. Midgley leaves the conversation open with regard to how humans should proceed, but does state that philosophers must forge ahead and make the human need to dissolve individual and collective ego “clear and understandable.”

I had a few questions:

Mainly: Was the point of this article to just say that humans need to become less self-concerned and more altruistic (with respect to the whole world) in their efforts to promote their well-being? If so, why is that so difficult?

But, Midgley seemed to say that it was important on some level for humans to be self-interested.

So how can humans reconcile their own self-interests against the interests of others within the biosphere? What conditions make this okay? What are the limits to this?

Finally: I’d just like to mention that the original Tron movie came out four years prior to the publication of the Barrow and Tipler book. Coincidence? I think not.

Ward, "Is the Crown of Creation a Dunce Cap?"

Ward begins his writing by pointing out that yes, humans are intelligent and have accomplished amazing things, but at the same time we are not as intelligent as we think we are. We don’t realize that our intelligence only extends as far as measurable and predictable knowledge, such as math or physics. We have yet to grasp knowledge where “the whole tends to be greater than the sum of its parts but not predictably so.”

To begin discussing the intellectual capacity of non-humans, Ward redefines intelligence as “the capacity to learn from experience and apply that learning to future challenges.” Animals accomplish this through pattern recognition and communication. Although we may not be able to understand their non-vocal “languages,” species are capable of communicating with each other, like how a bee dances to tell its fellow bees where to find food. We cannot understand them, but they also cannot understand us; there is a mutual misunderstanding from species to species – the intelligence of one species cannot be recognized by other species.

“Swarm intelligence” is another type of intelligence that Ward discusses. While one ant may not be able to survive very well on its own, a swarm of ants is very successful. The accumulation, in essence, of tiny bits of intelligence creates a larger intelligence that allows a swarm of ants to survive. Ward points out the fact that bees form an unconscious democracy when finding a new place to build a hive, yet humans would still be arguing and suing each other long after the bees have finished their new hive. He fails to recognize, however, that the bees build a new hive because it is necessary for their survival. The bees have an innate drive to build a new hive in order to survive, whereas a new community or democracy built by humans is artificial (a creation of the technosphere), not necessary for our survival.

The matter of “conscious intent” is brought up. As far as we can tell, non-humans, especially microbes and insects, do not have conscious intent. However, it is impossible for us to understand their consciousness, as it is impossible for them to know ours. We can think that we know what animals are thinking, but our anthropomorphism of animals gets in the way of the fact that we don’t actually know what animals are thinking. We are so separated from nature that we only see the anthropomorphism, and don’t actually get to appreciate the real thing. Because of the technosphere that is constantly surrounding us, we don’t recognize the intelligence in nonhuman species.

Our human intelligence may help the technosphere evolve, but it does not help us survive as a species. Ward claims that human intelligence is possibly just a way for us to rationalize the “destructive addictions to going faster and getting more stuff.” The key point that Ward drives at is that humans need to recognize some humility. While nonhuman intelligence is different than ours, we cannot say they are less intelligent than us. In fact, human intelligence can’t even comprehend the natural world. When we recognize and accept this, we can pay closer attention to the natural world and how it can help us become intelligent in other aspects of our lives.

Rowlands: Can Animals be Moral?

Rowlands offers three categories when considering animals as moral: 1) moral patients, 2) moral agents, 3) moral subjects. He then discusses how animals fit into these three. Moral patients are “legitimate objects of moral concern” that have “interests that should be taken into consideration”. Based on this definition it is not hard to see how animals could be considered as moral patients. They can feel and express these feelings at least in some way. They can express preferences and so these preferences should be taken into account. It is true that humans’ actions toward animals do not always reflect a respect for them as moral patients but one can see why they should.

A moral agent is “morally responsible” and therefore “can be morally evaluated for its motives and actions”. It is much more difficult to see animals as fitting into this category. Animals are not perceived as being responsible for their actions and therefore are not held accountable for them. To claim animals are moral agents is to claim that they are capable of making decisions and understanding the consequences of these decisions. If animals are moral patients then humans have a responsibility to act morally toward them. If animals are moral agents then they have a responsibility to act morally towards humans.

A moral subject “is, at least sometimes, motivated to act by moral reasons”. This seems to mean that if animals are moral subjects they have the motivation to act morally but cannot be evaluated based on these actions. This implies that animals cannot choose to act in a certain way and therefore their acting that way cannot be defined as morally motivated. Animals can only be moral subjects if they are moral agents because they have to be morally responsible to be morally motivated.

Based on this, it seems that animals are moral patients only. Rowlands claims that he will go on to prove that they are also moral subjects but based on the information provided, this does not seem to be the case.

Kant's Teleology

Kant argues for almost a new idea of teleology. He states that “nature’s purposiveness is for our cognitive faculties”, which is subjective when teleology is meant to be objective. This however is essential for his teleology because he says we naturally attribute purposiveness to nature. He argues that this is unavoidable, in a way arguing that anthropomorphism is unavoidable, and therefore we give nature intentionality. If this is unavoidable, Kant states we must use our reason to decide nature’s ends while at the same time recognizing that we are attributing intentionality on to nature. He says that scientists such as Newton, argue that we have to examine the mechanical processes of nature, but these processes are hidden from us. Kant argues that we must take a more broad view. By doing this for years we have been able to discover many laws of nature.

            Later on in this reading, Kant argues that we are either looking at nature in very mechanical terms or in very teleological terms. He describes these both as not being able to know truly what nature is but only being able to set principles by which we can view nature and use our reason with. Kant seems to be saying that there is no way to know what true nature is, but the closest way to know what it is, is to use reason.

            We have discussed anthropomorphism a lot in class, and in this essay Kant directly deals with it. I thought his argument was strong, but it still is scary thinking that we should determine the ends of nature, because that then effects the way we act towards nature, for example the polemical language we saw in the readings by Mcphee, and how that influenced the actions they took.

Kant goes to the movies

In thinking about Imanuel Kant's "Duties Towards Animals and Spirits," I could not help but think about a movie I have enjoyed consistently for the past 13 years, My Dog Skip, the coming of age story of small town, big brained Willie Morris and his precious dog, Skip. 
In My Dog Skip (I'm trying really hard not to ruin it in case you haven't seen it (in which case holler at me and i'll give you my amazon prime password to watch it ASAP)) there is a scene in which Skip, as what now we must understand is a thoughtless, feelingless dog, runs around Willie's baseball game stealing the show and ruining the game until havoc wreaks and Willie incurs harm on Skip. At the moment Willie does this, the whole town watching this little league game shrieks in terror that this kind hearted boy would hurt his dog. The way the fans react is exactly what Kant argues, "he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals"(82). Willie shortly after realizes just how wrong he was and just how much he can and did learn from his dog, causing him to go great distances to find him, something Kant would think of as an unnecessary direct action. I think a duty implies it is universal and ethical answer or action, so this one instance cannot exactly disprove the indirectness of animals to humans.When Willie is good to the dog, the whole town knows who both Willie and Skip are and this unpopular boy gets friends-pretty unbelievable display of treating an animal as a neighbor.  Later in this brilliant film, there is a moonshining bad guy who desperately wants to hurt or kill Skip because he thinks Skip is annoying. Despite Skip's being like 15 inches tall and what most of the philosophers have deemed thoughtless, the moonshiner believes Skip is getting in the way of some serious bad guy business. The moonshiner acts as Kant would suggest is not justified because "cruelty for sport cannot be justified"(82). Willie was not trying to be a bad person when he hit Skip, but he improperly tried to attribute a consequence and physical punishment onto Skip for his behavior. 
--Back to hurting animals for a consequence to their poor behavior-- Let us say that animals do not have feeling, and they are on earth to reflect human morals because what you treat something that cannot retaliate and has no direct duty onto humans and humans onto it should foil one's own values. If these creatures exist for humans, and humankind is the center, as this "Anthropocentrism" section in our compilation argues, there is no reason for humans to purposefully treat an animal badly, ever, which seems more like an argument for animals than humans. 
Kant's argument opens the door for anthropocentrism in a new light, one of morals; in order to be human, one must limit as much destruction as possible (83) because indirect duty is attached to everything. 
This makes me question why aren't more people more conscience? I hope we all think animal crush videos are bad and evil, but where does the disconnect come from when we don't feel bad about printing off too much paper or even swatting a fly?
Is Kant right? Does his weird spirit argument seem like Newton's (sorry I don't really address it here, I touched on it on Maggie's post-check her's out!)