Can art rescue us from technology?

Heidegger argues that the essence of technology is nothing technological.  Rather, technology is driven by enframing, the impulse for humans to order and quantify the natural world as materials and resources waiting for use.  He argues that this enframing causes technology, while not the cause of ecological disasters, to be an exasperating factor.  It becomes the source of a worldview that approaches nature in an unhealthy way.

What can overcome the bleak outlook that we are entrapped in a technological worldview?  Heidegger offers art as an alternative way of uncovering the hidden truth of the natural world.  Art is a form of poiesis, a process which reveals the essence of natural materials in their context, as opposed to the quantitative ordering of enframing.

The notion that art can be a means of revealing hidden truth is exemplified in Heidegger's example of the Rhine River.  He sees it currently (in the 1950s) revealed through technology, as a hydroelectric power plant dams the riverway to harness its power.  He contrasts the revealing through a power work as opposed to the version of the revealed through artwork, specifically in a poem of Friedrich Holderlin entitled "The Rhine."

This poem is a particularly poignant choice, as it describes how the landscape of the Rhine and the distant Alps "devolves /To man yet many a thing /Decided in secret...."  Thus art professes to be an alternative means through which the truth of which Heidegger speaks is disclosed.  This can be attested in the shear volume of poetry, music, and visual art that has been inspired merely by the landscape of the Rhine River, arguably far more than is revealed through geologic surveys or technical reports.

 

Die Lorelei, a rock above the Rhine River that is a famous subject of poetry and art.

(Wikipedia) 

The question that proceeds from this is whether art at its essence could really form a worldview that could displace the one formed by technology.  Among the considerations at hand is the use of technology in almost all forms of economic employment or production.  The arts are often seen as secondary components of society which are fueled monetarily by industry and its technology.  Could people abandon the economic incentive that technology offers and replace it with art?

Panel Discussion on Extreme Populations

Here's the link to an event next week that may be of interest given our recent discussions about population: https://www.facebook.com/events/413075622154392/?previousaction=join&ref_newsfeed_story_type=regular&source=1

Heidegger and Technology

Heidegger: "The Question Concerning Technology"

Contributor: Ben

In the opening lines of Heidegger’s essay, Heidegger informs us that “Questioning builds a way” (3). This essay contains Heidegger’s analyses of language, which provides insight into the relationship between human existence and the essence of technology. Heidegger begins by discussing and rejecting the colloquial and common definition of technology as incomplete; he tells us “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological”(4). He tells us that this approach is rooted in the ancient view which stated that “the essence of a thing is considered to be what the thing is”(4). This view which emphasizes the material and physical aspects/properties leads us to think of technology as means to an end and as a human activity; he calls this the instrumental-anthropological definition of technology. On this understanding, technology is a tool; it is the collection of machines, instruments, and devices we invent, assemble, and utilize. It is something we control.

Heidegger argues that this instrumental-anthropological view is correct in a trivial sense but it is also inherently incomplete and limited. Heidegger claims that the essence of technology is unaccounted for in the everyday understanding. Because of his beliefs about language and truth, Heidegger proposes that in order to encounter or discover the essence of technology we need to describe a technological mode of being. Through analysis of his native German language and ancient Greek, Heidegger arrives at the claim that the essence of technology has everything to do with revealing(12). This “revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology…. is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such”(14). Heidegger’s main point here is that the modern, technologically influenced revealing understands all phenomena—animals, atoms, plants, people, etc—as nothing more than energy resources to be used or stored for use. Heidegger presents the Rhine and the trend of renaming personnel departments as ‘human resources’ as evidence for his claim. Heidegger wants to show that the technological mode of being reduces the natural beauty of the Rhine into a mere resource. This revealing has led us to think of conversations with new people as “networking opportunities” instead of a chance to enjoy the company of other beings. Heidegger’s claim is that our naïve-instrumental understanding of technology is blinding us to the actual case in which technology builds a deeply reductive and destructive view of the world. Heidegger is arguing that this ugly, reductive view defines modernity as a way of being and understanding the world. He claims that this view follows once one realizes that mathematical or exact science “demands that nature be orderable as standing-reserve” and requiring that “nature report itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remain orderable as a system of information”. By showing that modern-technology’s mode of revealing only reveals beings as solely the measurable and the manipulatable, Heidegger argues that our thinking reduces beings into not-beings; existing things into data points and quantitative descriptions. I think Heidegger is trying to point us towards two ideas here. The first is that the kind of technological revealing either ignores or destroys the wonder and marvel in beings like the Rhine; and secondly that we are unmoved by loss. I think Heidegger would say that we respond to the loss of natural wonder by substituting a “technological feeling” like the drive for information and consumption of entertainment and information.

                However, it would be a misunderstanding of Heidegger to only think of technology as a negative and perverting thing. Heidegger himself states that “It [technology] is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth”(12). Heidegger recognizes the urgent danger that technology presents but he also understands that it is a stage in the unfolding of Being. This leads us to the question: is technological revealing and its effects on the natural world something humans are responsible for? Heidegger tells us that humankind is the active agent of technological revealing so we must have some part in the responsibility. Yet on the other hand, he says “Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in the ordering as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork”(18). In effort to shed more light on this point, we must dive into Heidegger’s own terminology; specifically his concept of Enframing. Yet this is where I am uncertain about what Heidegger is actually getting at but here goes.

 Enframing is that challenge which drives man to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve(19). He also describes it as “the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e, challenges him forth, to reveal the real….(20). Enframing is a particular ordaining of Destining.  Where Destining is “what first starts man upon a way of revealing”; it is an apriori transcendental aspect of our Being (of dasein?) and thus, it is beyond our control. Technology then is a manner of the essential “swaying of being”; it is of Being’s own unfolding.

                Unsurprisingly Heidegger has more to say and Heidegger leads us farther down the rabbit hole as he develops his previous claim that technological thinking defines our age. To see this let us return to the previous example of the Rhine. Heidegger sees the old wooden bridge as an example of Poiesis. Poiesis is a process of gathering natural materials in a way where the anthropological purpose brings forth the essence of the materials and the natural environment it is in. But does this not suggest that technological thinking existed before our age? If so how can it be the defining trait of modernity? Heidegger answers this in his discussion of Poiesis. He is suggesting that our age is dominated by technological thinking and Enframing. Heidegger is arguing that Enframing “drives out every other possibility of revealing”, and that it blinds us from the concealing-unconcealing nature of knowledge and forces us into one reductive viewpoint.

Now remember the discussion of our apathetic stance towards loss that Heidegger identifies. This happens because we are Enframed by technological thinking. I think Heidegger is claiming that we have forgotten the fourfold nature of causation. Importantly, one must not hear Heidegger’s words as calling for a radical abandonment of technological thinking. Heidegger warns that we should neither “push on blindly with technology” nor “curse it as the work of the devil” (330). Heidegger is not advocating for an end to technology but rather a reconceptualization of it and a recognition of how our interacting with it changes ourselves.

-What do you think of Heidegger’s heavy reliance on linguistic analysis and appeal to definition? Is it a good way to get at the truth? Does “Questioning” build a way? What about concerns about Greek being a dead language? How can we know we are correct in our understanding of the language?

-How is Heidegger’s understanding of truth as a process of revealing related or different from other author’s understanding of truth and nature? (Ex. Kant, Nietzsche, Callicot, Aristotle, King)

- Is Heidegger’s analysis of modern science still fair today?

-How might Heidegger’s suggestions alter our political policies toward nature and is it possible for modern society to accept and embrace them? If so what kind of measures would need to be taken for this kind of conceptual overhaul?

Wired article that may be of interest

This is an article by Bill Gates that came out today on Wired's website. I just thought some of you all might find it interesting, especially since it relates to some of our recent readings.

For instance, Gates trusts that science and technology will save the world, saying, "At heart I’m an optimist. Technology is helping us overcome our biggest challenges." Along those lines, he talks about things like poverty and the Green Revolution in Africa (about which I'm not convinced he's actually right-- see our readings from the other day about sustainable ag from Jackson, Keller, and Brummer). 

Anyway, you can just read it yourself and draw your own conclusions. Here's the link: http://www.wired.com/business/2013/11/bill-gates-wired-essay/

Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons"

Garrett Hardin explores the concept of the tragedy of the commons in light of the depletion of natural resources. Hardin explains overpopulation in terms of the tragedy and it's causes. 

The tragedy of the commons is the outcome of many individuals, acting autonomously, depleting a shared resource. Hardin uses the famous example of a "pasture open to all". Herdsmen might bring their animals to graze on this land and for each additional animal he brings he benefits greatly. Every other rational herdsman with access to the land will do the same and will bring more and more animals to graze. Eventually, the animals will begin to degrade the land. But the negative utility for each herdsman is shared and nominal and so the negative utility from land degradation is outweighed by the positive utility of a larger herd. This pasture is a microcosm of the shared resource that is our natural environment. As population grows exponentially and the world's resources remain finite, something has got to give. 

While overpopulation is a truly pressing concern and the tragedy of the commons is a completely valid concept, the rest of the essay gets ethnocentric and classist on many different levels. Hardin condemns families that reproduce excessively (greater than the replacement rate) regardless of culture. He proposes basing foreign aid upon birthdate reduction. He suggests awarding young women "non-baby"stipends. He also majorly criticized what he sees as the welfare state and the individuals that depend on it. Is Hardin's argument at all discredited by these statements?

Hardin also clearly attached a system of ethics to this concept. He claims that to have excessive amounts of children is immoral and he explains "the immorality of being softhearted" about population control. Even his closing words are, "making these tough conditions is the kindest thing we can do for the needy peoples of the world. And, ultimately, for the whole world." Given this concept, what is the answer to overpopulation? How does it relate to ethics?

The Impact of Population Growth

People are bad. Well, more like having lots of people is bad. Or actually, how said people live is pretty important, too. The point is, we need to address population growth if we want to have any chance of mitigating global climate crises such as climate change, pollution, species extinction, and the like. Ehrlich and Holdren set out to disband the idea that US population size and growth are nothing to worry about, a myth that I personally find hard to believe ever existed. Their discussion centers on five theorems about population size and per capita impact, global context, population density and distribution, meaning of environment, and solutions both theoretical and practical, respectively. They introduce a formula to try to gauge total negative impact of us on the environment: I = P x F(P), where P is the population and F is per capita impact. This equation makes clear that impact can increase faster than linearly with population. In fleshing out the theorems that introduce this essay, they basically explain why are screwed, and how what we thought we knew, we actually don’t.

With increasing resource use, diminishing returns increase per capita energy use and environmental impact as we try our best to get to the last little bits of (effectively or actual) non-renewable resources. Another worry is the threshold effect, where straw-that-broke-the-camel’s-back type scenarios result in rapid widespread problems, such as a forest of dead trees. Direct cause and effect problems not enough to scare you? Then consider the issue of synergistic effects, where problems work together in sync to make the sum worse than the individual parts. And to even maintain the environmental status quo increases disproportionately in cost/difficulty as population increases. Trying to increase per capita effectiveness of pollution control alone highlights aforementioned issues such as diminishing returns and threshold effects, and economies of scale are basically irrelevant, as these guys already calculated them in their gloomy evaluations.

Thinking in terms of a global context makes clear the uneven resource consumption and environmental destruction by (over-) developed countries, as well as how such places are not even really allowing the possibility that underdeveloped countries can follow in their footsteps towards prosperity. Here the authors note that even if population growth were halted or even reduced, if per capita consumption remained the same (or increased), we would still be in pretty deep (like, existential) trouble.

Population is best thought of in terms of carrying capacity (of regions and scaling up to the planet as whole, really), not just space itself; many of the worst environmental problems are essentially independent of how people are distributed. And also, redistributing people would be tough, in part because people live where they do for reasons such as its being a favorable environment for people.

Environment does not just mean forests and streams and stuff, and crowding seems to lead to increased aggressiveness (as do higher temperatures, but that’s not here in this text). The authors say our health suffers with population growth [see crowding, malnutrition, carriers of disease (although actually living in urban areas can definitely reduce carbon footprints/resource use as well as lead to better information/cultural exchanges and lots of other good stuff like good old fashioned compassion, for example, which benefit the species as whole, in my opinion, but again, that’s not in this reading- that’s just me)].

Theoretical solutions are not actually solutions most of the time, hate to break it to you. Tech solutions are all too often too little, too late, too expensive, too weird, or otherwise insufficient. And also most just shift our impacts, as opposed to removing them. So that has to be considered. Don’t rely on technology to be our savior.

We cannot have complacency (the authors call it “unjustified and counterproductive”) towards the many problems we face as a species and for the planet as a whole. There is no single solution or even small set of big solutions to save ourselves, but working on the population issue is a good start, especially since it is so big a problem and is so slow to take effect. So we better get on it, pronto.

In this reading, Ehrlich and Holdren do not get around to saying how they want to work on the problem of population growth. And that in itself seems like a pretty big problem. If you’re not careful you’ll get weird not good scenarios like forced sterilizations (shout out to India), heavy handed child policies (China), mass killings, attempts to label people as more or less worthy of living, increased eco-terrorism, and the like. How can we humanely address the issue of too many people using too many resources without eliminating human agency? Development seems like a pretty good solution, since it generally results in smaller families. But that, as is always the case with environmental issues, is not a clean and tidy silver bullet solution. Other thoughts? (Also, I wonder if the decades between when this was written and now have at all changed the situation as it is presented here... if so, I’m not optimistic that things are better today.)

The Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change

When the topic of climate change comes up, I immediately think about the number of American politicians (and citizens, for that matter) that strongly believe “there is no such thing as global warming” or that “climate fluxuations on Earth are completely normal”. Brown’s article addresses these common statements, along with a few others, and makes a compelling argument that intervention must occur now because of ethical and moral issues that go along with global climate change.

Brown sees climate change as a moral issue. He presents eight different ethical issues, along with factual context and ethical analysis for each issue. One point Brown emphasizes in many ethical analyses is that many of those who are most harmed by climate change have contributed little to the cause of the problem. Conversely, those who have contributed the most to climate change are often affected the least. Thus, some of the poorest countries are affected the most by climate change but cannot do anything about it. Brown’s article states “the human-induced warming that the world is now experiencing is already causing 150,000 deaths and 5 million incidents of disease each year from additional malaria and diarrhea, mostly in the poorest nations” (9). Brown says that everyone has a right to life, liberty, and personal security and uses this as evidence to argue that there is no ethically acceptable excuse to allow global climate change, because these changes threaten basic human rights. Brown seeing environmental problems as ethical issues, and his evidence for it, is definitely a compelling argument. Most people probably do not realize that global climate change affect those in poverty much more than others. The media portrays common negative effects of global climate change with examples of ice caps melting and ocean levels rising, not with an increase in disease among the poorest of people. If the media presented the negative effects directly affecting people today, would more people consider taking action?

While many governments and individuals think there is not enough evidence of global climate change to justify taking action on the issue, Brown presents ethical issues with this claim (Issue IV) in points 7 and 8 of his ethical analysis that are hard to argue against. Brown sees intervention against green house gases emissions (GHGs), which cause climate change, as a human duty because of the serious risks of climate change. However, no matter what evidence exists, I think there will still be obstinate people who refuse to support taking action of global environmental problems. It seems that the current struggle (at least in the U.S.) is proving that global climate change is an issue, rather than brainstorming ways to reduce human effects. What will it take for people to recognize that this is a serious issue if current scientific evidence is not compelling enough?

Corpses and Robots - Supplemental Videos

Here are some YouTube videos that relate to our discussion of human edibility:

Modern methods of disposing of human remains


The uncanny valley


Geminoids (advanced humanoid robots modeled on their creators)

Uncanny Goodness of Being Edible to Bears

      Being killed is unfortunate, but is being eaten unnatural? The idea of being eaten by bears makes us uneasy, Hatley explains why. He reminds us that when we enter nature we become part of the web of life, we are no longer lawyers, doctors, teachers, businessmen, and students. We are flesh, and therefore we are prey. We retain our humanity in nature, but nonhuman beings are not obligated or able consider that their prey has feelings and mortality. When we as humans take on the role of the prey we retain only one thing, our flesh. We are now a means, to the end of the predator.

     Is it inhuman for a predator to treat us as it would any other prey? What differentiation can the predator make between human flesh and typical prey flesh, which would cause it to reconsider ingesting us? We cannot project our own societal standards for dining on humans onto natural beings. Hatley explains that “in the wilderness we willingly enter into the risk of being killed and eaten by wild animals,” in doing so we acknowledge that the rules and regulations of civilization do not apply in nature. (Hatley 15) Therefore, I don’t find it surprising that most people who have been mauled or partially eaten by a bear have no resentful feelings toward the animals. For on what grounds can these people reasonably detest their predator? The morally oblivious grizzly bear that kills and eats a human in nature is no different the morally oblivious eagle that kills a salmon and eats it.

     I choose to methodically cut away the numerous tendrils of the innumerable beings wishing to take a bite out of me. (Hatley 14) I do so not because I have a fear being eaten, but because I wish to avoid an unfortunate and untimely death. It is natural for me to want to avoid death, regardless if it how it happens. But, once I am killed what difference does it make if I am eaten by a nonhuman after my death? At least my body would be useful for the animal that eats me. Hatley acknowledges this type of standpoint, but exaggerates it when he uses Mr. Peacock as an accurate example. Instead this illustration paints a caricature of how to cope with being eaten. And wrongly emphasizes that Mr. Peacock was indifferent about being killed, which quite frankly I find impossible.  I agree with that we should not bear a grudge against the animals that would eat us, because it’s natural (Hatley 24.) But, that doesn’t mean I will not avoid being killed by them, because death is unfortunate.

The Ethics of Eating Meat

Singer lays out many of the themes we have seen in White, Callicott, and Leopold. In presenting multiple arguments for the consumption of meat he is able to systematically refute each argument and strengthen the notion that animals are morally considerable beings. He draws conclusions similar to earlier authors we read in that animals have interests and should be treated ethically just as babies and adults with disabilities should be treated ethically. He also notes the fact that speciesism can be rooted in religious traditions.

Here we get our first look into the world of factory farming as well as alternative farming practices. The real issue is however, is that the reader must decide whether or not they believe killing animals for meat is ethical, and how do they justify this? I imagine it would be a much different world if everyone had to slaughter and process his/her own meat. I know plenty of people who eat meat on a regular basis, but if they had to kill the animal themselves I imagine they would not be able to do so. How many of you would be willing to kill a cow to have your next hamburger?

Singer mentions that hunting and then consuming animals is perhaps more ethical because the animals are able to enjoy their life as free beings. However he points out that it is not always this simple and often times hunting can also be cruel. It comes down to the fact that today, eating meat is really a thing of convenience. We are able to purchase meat at the grocery store, yet few of us know (or even care) how it actually got there. Fast food restaurants can sell meat products for only a few dollars and no one questions how they were made. Not only does the consumption of meat leave a bigger footprint, it can have serious health consequences. Yet, much of the developed world does not question how we get our meat. The animal agriculture sector today is run largely by powerful private companies that have found ways to get skirt around regulations. If there was greater transparency of the large companies so that consumers could witness the methods used in meat production, maybe fewer people would be inclined to eat meat. Attempts have been made with films such as Food Inc., yet there has been no significant drop in meat consumption. It would be one thing if the presence of factory farming ended hunger, malnutrition, or food deserts, yet this is not the case. How can we justify factory farming when these issues still exist and there are sustainable alternatives to eating meat?

Eating meat, at least in the South where I come from, is much more than the simple act of consuming food. It carries social connotations, for example a man who eats meat is perceived as much more of a man than he who chooses not to. People believe that having meat at every meal is a necessity. Contests are created to see who can eat the most meat. Consuming meat has become part of our identity. How then do we convince people today that there is a viable alternative to eating meat?

The Ethics of Eating Meat

This was a great article to read as we wrap up the second and third sections of the class because it does a good job of summarizing many of the arguments we've already seen regarding what ethical treatment (if any) we owe to animals.  The majority of these are brought up in the section titled "Unsound Defenses of Factory Farming," where Singer reminds us of why the three arguments are invalid:

1. Argument: Animals don't treat us well, so why should we treat them well?
   Rebuttal: Babies don't treat us well, either, but we still have ethical obligations to them.
2. Argument: The Benjamin Franklin defense.
   Rebuttal: The Franklin defense is a form of ethical naturalism ("ethics for dummies", as Professor Grady called it)
3. Argument: Sacrificing animals is necessary to providing for human well-being.
   Rebuttal: There are alternatives we could use that certainly wouldn't require factory farming, and likely wouldn't require the consumption of any meat at all.

If none of these arguments are valid, then we are left with the question of what (if anything) does entitle us to eat meat. Singer says that the most convincing arguments for eating meat come from those who most adamantly oppose factory farming.  Even with today’s most popular foodies, such as Michael Pollan, however, Singer raises some important objections. The last section of the article seems to suggest that the only unquestionably ethically sound way to eat meat is through dumpster diving.  Some of the dumpster divers argue that dumpstering, or “freeganism” is the only way to entirely remove oneself from the industrial food system and its ethical dilemmas.  It’s a form of “recycling” that they say is the lowest impact type of consumption.  Although I am drawn to the idea as a realistic way of coping with the modern food industry, I think it holds little value as a basis for our food ethics.  Contrary to what Tim and Shane say, “freeganism” isn’t removing them from the industrial food system at all, but rather is completely dependent upon that system and the waste it produces.  Rather than “recycling” our food, shouldn’t we just change to a system that produces less excess and higher quality to begin with?

-Taylor Sieben

Aldo Leopold - The Land Ethic

As the title suggest, Leopold's argument hinges on the understand and conception of the "land ethic". As apparent in Callicott's Essay, this was a relatively new conception of ethics that was entirely ecocentric (and apparently, vehemently argued among modern philosophers). Leopold's argument is created from a need to re-understand and recapitulate where woman and man must place their ethical considerations. Leopold argues that these new considerations must be based in a central "ethic dealing with human's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it". How does the come into realization? A deliberate move away from any mood of anthropocentrism and a move instead towards considering the woman and man as apart of the world around them and not necessarily being the world around them.

As biotic beings, we, along with the rest of nature, evolve. Beings within eco-environments evolve, the system responds, the organism lives or dies, and wonderfully, the evolutionary chain continues to grow. It is easy to think of human as having the unique position of having stepped outside of this cycle; yet, our DNA still manifests itself in novel and unique ways, our social consciousness changes, declines, grows, and generally moves (in any particular direction), and we continue as individuals that both reflect our past and stand as a new, and perhaps more wiser, form of our genetically former selves. We do, however, stand in a point where our actions do indeed cause long-term, destructive, and certainly poisonous results within the eco-system that once supported our livelihood and well-being as earthly organisms. Leopold's point, then, derives itself from our ongoing process of evolution both literally and metaphorically. Certainly, evolution has brought us,  at least, to highly considering the world around us. With a consciousness, humans have a unique power to reflect on the process of living, to understand that we have an ability to affect and to affect, we can change what of which we are conscious.

The expansion of new moral considerability must be considered if we are to call ourselves as evolving beings. Our considerability of not man-of-nature but man-within-nature must be subject to this evolution as well. "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." Leopold argues that it is this idea for which must be striven. The evolution lies in the consideration of nature as inherently worth moral considerability and as well, the idea that man lies within nature as a product of it.

Taylor's The Ethics of Respect For Nature

            In Paul W. Taylor’s The Ethics of Respect for Nature, Taylor outlines his biocentric outlook on nature and justifies his viewpoint. The biocentric outlook on nature consists of four points: 1. Humans are members of Earth’s community of life. 2. The Earth’s natural ecosystem is interconnected in many complex ways. 3. Each individual organism is thought of as a teleological center of life, pursing its own good. 4. All the points mentioned prior implies that humans are not superior to any other species. Taylor makes the claim that all things have inherent worth regardless of their consciousness. “The idea of a being having a good of its own, as I understand it, does not entail that the being must have interests or take an interest in what affects its life for better of for worse” (176). This claim that Taylor makes supports the idea that human superiority is non-existent. Taylor then goes on to explain, “the inherent worth of an entity does not depend on its merits” (179).  At the very end of his essay, Taylor states that even though all things have inherent worth, this does not imply equal that all things have moral rights.

Questions:

I know that Taylor makes it clear in his essay that he does not want to touch on moral rights at the moment, but I am curious. What does the biocentric outlook on nature imply in terms of our responsibility towards animals and plants? If everything has inherent worth, why do we have the right to kill other animals for our own wellbeing? Or do we have this right?

Also, Taylor states that we only have the ability to use reason because that is how we adapted for our survival. But doesn’t this ability give us some sort of right to use other animals? Other species use other animals to promote their wellbeing. Through evolution we gained the ability to use other organisms to our advantage, just as other animals have, therefore shouldn’t we take advantage of our abilities? On the other hand, being the only organism to possess reason, are we bestowed with a responsibility to take care of other organisms and take action to promote their wellbeing? 

All Animals Are Equal

     Singer is a utilitarian; whether or not an action is good depends upon its consequences, specifically whether it minimizes pain and produces pleasure. Here, he argues that all animals are equally considerable, and that their pains and pleasures are equally important to consider when we act. He first details how speciesism (privileging our own species interests over others) is akin to racism and sexism inasmuch as its logic depends on so privileging the interests of a certain group of socially "superior" individuals on the basis of some arbitrary characteristic (170-1). From this, he says, we cannot base our notion of equality on the idea of sameness or overall comparison of characteristics among sex or race; a characteristic itself (like intelligence, or money-making capacity) could still be used as a rubric for social hierarchy (170-1). He notes an additional reason for not thinking this way: if it is the case that some traits are genetically determined, racism would be seemingly "defensible" (171).* 

Equality, then, does not depend on characteristics:

Equality is a moral idea, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests.

 The "principle of equality" is not descriptive, but a "prescription of how we should treat humans" and, as it shall happen, other animals (171). To make this leap, Singer states that our equality consists in each one of our interests counting for no more or less than "one" (171). Interests themselves stem from the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, for "suffering and enjoying things" (172). If a being suffers, then, its (his or her) interests must be taken into consideration when we make our moral calculations. All animals are, thus, equally considerable because all are equally capable of suffering and having interests. If we can at all prevent suffering, we ought to do so. This does not imply that we should afford animals the same rights as we have, although Singer would say that we owe them at least the right of protection from any suffering we might inflict on them (170, 173).

He then applies this framework of equal consideration to two phenomena: meat-eating (and consequently factory farming) and laboratory testing using animals. We eat meat, he claims, purely because it gratifies our tastes; it produces in us a certain kind of pleasure (172-3). We could survive (even thrive) on plant-based proteins, which means that we have no pressing need to eat animals. Thus, in order to produce the least amount of suffering, we should stop eating meat (173). Animal testing, similarly, seems to be a privileging of human interests. We are willing to overlook the suffering of laboratory animals in order to broaden our own knowledge; Singer asks the question why an experimenter would rather use an adult rat than a human infant (173). The answer, he thinks, is mere speciesism.

I am somewhat apprehensive of the above. In principle, I do think we should endeavor to minimize the amount of suffering in the world; factory farms are terribly cruel and our continued support of them is ethically unjustifiable. But I do think that there are multiple ways that one can measure a balance of pleasure or pains. Certain pleasures or pains might well weigh more than others, even as individuals count for one. Under a different metric, we could justify animal testing by highly valuing continued freedom from disease. This does leave us with the problem of justifying why we use adult animals instead of fellow-humans, and why the latter seems more abominable to us than the former.

_______________________________________

* It's important to note that this essay is written in 1974, when the scientific jury was still (more or less, although probably less) out on whether genetics determined character traits like intelligence. His claim regarding genetics and characteristics, however, seems to me to provide a further basis for his argument for animal equality, in addition to bolstering his argument against equality-from-capability. Even if differing genetic codes impart differing capacities among diverse animal groups, superior ability or capacity in no way relates to the equality of those individuals. 

Animal Rights or Animal Welfare?

 

A few weeks ago I was able to attend the annual conference of the Association of Zoos & Aquariums (AZA) in Kansas City.  The AZA is the organization responsible for accrediting zoos in the Americas with a rigorous set of requirements.  One of my main objectives during the conference was to network with animal welfare scientists, following up with my research this summer in San Diego and shopping for potential graduate advisors.  This was a particularly good year for me to go because animal welfare was a significant part of the conference proceedings.  There were five separate sessions on animal welfare issues, and one session offered the first preliminary results of a massive 2012 study of elephant welfare in zoos, the largest study of its kind to date.

One session I attended addressed the work of the Animal Welfare Committee, a body which deliberates the standards of animal welfare to which the AZA holds its member zoos.  The committee is made up largely of scientists in whose work I have an interest, including my mentor from this summer.  One of the talks during the session, given by Dr. Nadja Wielebnowski of the Oregon Zoo, was called "Defining Animal Welfare".  I want to share some of the points from that talk as a counter-perspective to Tom Regan's perspective on animal rights.

 

Brambell's five freedoms (1965)

The Animal Welfare Committee (AWC) thinks of itself as promoting ethics with science.  Their proposed ethical obligation does not seem too different from Regan's view:  "Animals should be treated kindly and without inflicting any unnecessary pain or suffering."  In order to appropriately address this ethical concern, the AWC promotes the use of scientific metrics to assess animals' states of well-being.  This combination of ethics and science is evident in their definition of animal welfare:

Animal welfare is the degree to which an animal can cope with its environment and associated challenges as determined by a combination of measures of physical and psychological health and well-being.

Animal welfare refers to an animal's collective physical, mental, and emotional states over a period of time and is measured on a continuum.

 This definition proposes that animals experience good welfare when they are under conditions like those projected in Brambell's five freedoms (poster above).  This definition also makes animal welfare measurable on a continuum, taking it out of the realm of subjective speculation and placing it the realm of science.  It is for this reason that the AWC is made up largely of scientists, as they would have the most objective view on what constitutes good animal welfare.  The AZA also prompts its member zoos to use science to monitor the welfare of their collections.

Overall animal welfare science is relatively new thing on the zoo scene.  Prior to the last decade the quality of animal care was thought to be the only factor affecting animal welfare, but now more factors like psychological states, environmental enrichment, and hormone levels are being taken into account.  This requires a barrage of scientific monitoring that can assess levels of all of these factors.

This leads back into philosophy in the AWC's stance on animal rights:  The concepts of animal welfare and animal rights are considered closely related and sometimes synonymous, but the AWC considers itself a proponent of animal welfare and not animal rights.  The difference is in the use of science;  the AWC considers animal welfare a scientific and ethical decision based on a scientific approach to life condition, while animal rights is an ethical and philosophical belief, one which cannot be validated with science.

What do you think of this distinction?  Is the AWC correct in limiting its scope to what it can assess scientifically, or does failing to endorse animal rights represent a bias in favor of zoos?  Given Regan's proposed goals of the animal rights movement, his viewpoint would not favor the existence of zoos at all, while the AZA continually argues for the role that zoos play in educating the public about conservation and providing support for animal conservation around the globe.